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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. 
NATURE OF CASE AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
Respondent/Cross-Appellant, Susan Carol Olson, hereinafter 
referred to as "Susan," and Appellant/Cross-Respondent, Marvin 
Raynell Montoya, hereinafter referred to as "Marvin" were married 
on January 12, 2001. During the marriage, the parties had two 
minor childre~, and 
both born on
On February 7, 2006, Susan filed a Verified Complaint for 
Divorce. (R. pp. 12-16). Marvin filed an Answer and Counterclaim. 
(R. pp. 17-23). Both parties sought primary physical custody of 
the parties' children and child support in accordance with the 
Idaho Child Support Guidelines. 
While the divorce action was pending, Susan filed a Motion for 
Temporary Support and a hearing was held on March 27, 2006. (Tr. 
p .1, L. 4 - p. 18, L. 6) . The magistrate issued an Order for 
Temporary Support based upon Marvin's representation of his income 
despite a showing by Susan of Marvin's historical income. Also 
while the divorce action was pending, Marvin filed several pre-
trial motions. 
""'--- 1 
Based upon a stipulation reached between the parties, the 
Court entered a Partial Judgment and Decree on May 16, 2006, which 
resolved the property issues in the case. (R. pp. 24-27) . 
On the morning of trial, the parties stipulated to a parenting 
schedule, which was memorialized in a Partial Judgment and Decree 
entered on October 10, 2006. (R. pp. 28-33). Thus, at trial on 
September 12, 2006, the magistrate only heard evidence regarding 
the parties' re spec ti ve incomes for child support purposes and 
whether Susan should be awarded costs and attorney fees. (Tr. p. 
19, L. 4 - p. 193, L. 10). The magistrate entered its Findings of 
Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order on December 7, 2006, and the 
Final Judgment and Decree of Divorce on January 10, 2007. (R. pp. 
36-51). (R. pp. 52-62). 
Susan appealed to the district court arguing that the 
magistrate erred in calculating Marvin's income for purposes of 
establishing child support by ignoring or misconstruing evidence of 
Marvin's income as presented at trial. (R. pp. 63-66) . Susan 
further argued that the magistrate failed to review the income and 
expenses from Marvin's self-employment or the operation of his 
business, thereby ignoring over $130,000 of Marvin's income. (R. 
pp. 63-66). Finally, Susan argued that she is entitled to costs 
and attorney fees at trial and on appeal . 
.,.....,.,...._.,.,. ..................... , _____ ... ---- -_ .......... - -----
The appeal to the district court was heard by the Honorable D. 
Duff McKee. The district court "issued a Memorandum Decision 
vacating the magistrate's findings on child support and remanding 
the case to the magistrate to make appropriate findings consistent 
with the district court's decision. (R. pp. 67-71). 
On the issue of costs and attorney fees, the district court 
awarded Susan costs and stated, "[n]o attorney fees at this stage; 
the magistrate may consider the issue of attorney fees for the 
entirety of the proceedings after remand." (R. p. 71). Before the 
magistrate addressed the issues on remand, Marvin filed this 
instant appeal. (R. pp. 72-74). 
On January 29, 2008, Susan filed a Motion for Costs and 
Attorney Fees at Trial, On Appeal to the District Court, and on 
Appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court. (Supp. R. pp. 13-19). In her 
motion, Susan argued in part that the disparity between her income 
and that of Marvin's was significant and that she did not have the 
financial resources for attorney fees in attempting to obtain a 
proper child support award. 
(Supp. R. pp. 20-27). 
(Supp. R. p. 17). Marvin objected. 
After hearing arguments from both counsel, the magistrate 
denied Susan's motion. (Supp. R. pp. 39-40). Susan filed a Notice 
of Cross-Appeal on May 22, 2008. (Supp. R. pp. 41-43). Susan then 
requested, and was granted, an Order for direct permissive appeal. 
(Supp. R. pp. 44-49). 
B. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
During the marriage, Susan and Marvin had two minor children. 
(R. p. 29). At the time of trial, Susan was employed as the 
director of administration at Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley, LLP. 
(Tr. p. 53, L. 5 - L. 6). Susan's salary for 2006 was $93,000 per 
year, which included her b9nus. (Tr. p. 32, L. 25 - p. 33, L. 18). 
Marvin was self-employed and the owne,;r of MS Administrative 
Services, Inc. ("MS"), MST Insurance Agency, Inc. ("MST"), and 
Montoya Enterprises, LLC ("Montoya Enterprises"). (Tr. p. 84, L. 
16 - L. 20). 
During the pendency of the case, Susan filed a Motion for 
Temporary Support. At the hearing on Susan's motion, Marvin's 
counsel stated: "I will represent to the court without testimony 
that we would base Mr. Montoya's income on $136,140." (Tr. p. 10, 
L. 22 - 24). Susan provided the magistrate with information from 
the parties' 2005 tax return, indicating that Marvin's income was 
$263,531 in 2005. (Tr. p. 11, L. 13 - 17). At the conclusion of 
the hearing, the magistrate held: 
I tend to look at child support early in 
the case by considering where the factual 
issues lie, and there is obviously some 
factual issues to decide regarding his income. 
You're claiming it's 136. They're claiming it 
could be as high as it is in 2005 which is 
263, a substantial swing. But I .tend to be 
conservative about it because of two reasons. 
One is if it's proven to me later that income 
was underestimated, underset, that he is 
actually earning more, I do have the authority 
to recalculate it and make any recalculation 
retroactive. So, I tend to take the parties' 
figures at face value of the way they 
represent them. 
(Tr. p. 13, L. 14 - p. 14, L. 1). The magistrate then ordered 
Marvin to pay to Susan temporary child support in the amount of 
$1,243 per month beginning in April, 2006. Additionally, the 
magistrate ordered the parties to pay their pro rata share of work-
related day care and medical insurance premiums for the children. 
(Tr. p. 14, L. 3 - L. 16). 
At trial, Susan presented evidence, based upon the parties' 
tax returns, of Marvin's historical income, which averaged $338,629 
for years 2005, 2004, and 2003. 
See Exhibits 19, 48, 49, and 2. 
(Tr. p. 25, L. 23 - p. 27, L.22). 
Susan indicated that she was 
seeking a retroactive child support adjustment back to April of 
2006. ( Tr . p . 2 7 , L . 2 5 - p . 2 8 , L . 2) . Susan testified that 
Marvin's apparent reduction in income was caused by Marvin using 
his commissions to pay rent to his other company. (Tr. p. 28, L. 14 
- p. 29, L. 9). Susan presented evidence of a financial statement 
created by Marvin, Exhibit 52A, wherein Marvin stated that his 
income as of August 11, 2005 was $398,000. 
p.30, L. 6). 
(Tr. p. 29, L. 10 -
At trial, Marvin testified that he received a salary from MS 
in the amount of $109,800. (Tr. p. 70, L. 20 - L. 21). Marvin 
testified that although he received a bonus in the past, that he 
would not take a bonus in 2006. (Tr. p. 7, L. 3 - L. 7). Susan's 
counsel then asked about the commissions Marvin traditionally 
received as follows: 
Q: And your projected income from MST 
before you pay it to rent for this 
year is what? 
A: I have no projected income from MST, 
period. 
Q: What are your commission that you 
receive? How much commissions have 
you received so far from MST so far 
this year? 
A: I received no commissions from MST. 
Q: Where are those commission income 
going? 
A: There is income coming to MST, and 
that income is going to MS. 
Q: What amount of income has come to 
MST that's gone to MS? 
A: I don' t know the exact numbers . The 
accountant will testify to the exact 
numbers that keeps records. 
Q: Well, it is approximately 147 to 
165,000? 
A: It could be. 
Q: All right. And then, you take that 
income when it comes into MS and you 
pay it to Montoya Enterprises for 
rent? 
A: That's correct. 
Q: How much do you pay Montoya Enterprises from 
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that income for rent? 
A: I'm not sure of the exact number. 
You can get that from the 
accountant. He handles all that, 
but it's approximately 17 to 20,000 
a month. 
(Tr. p. 71, L. 8 - p. 72, L. 7). 
Marvin testified that his total income for 2006 would be 
$135,932, consisting of his salary of $109,080, independent 
commissions of $22,599, vehicle lease benefit of $1,378, gasoline 
reimbursement of $325, and a .. second vehicle reimbursement of 
$2,550. (Tr. p. 86, L. 21 - p. 87, L. 2). 
Fernando Veloz, chief financial officer for MS, testified with 
respect to commission income that, 
... [T]he commission that's coming in to MST 
Insurance Agency is basically - - because of 
the closely held entities that these are, this 
commission expense or income that's coming in 
is actually going out and it's being paid to 
MS for administrative services. This 
administrative service, basically, is - - is, 
in turn, being paid out as rent to - - on 
behalf of MS to Montoya Enterprises. 
(Tr. p. 126, L. 25 - p. 127, L. 7). Montoya Enterprises is a 
company solely owned by Marvin. Mr. Veloz also testified that the 
gross receipts or sales for MS were going to be higher in 2005 than 
in previous years. (Tr. p. 144, L. 21 - p. 147, L. 2). 
The magistrate recognized the issue and stated, directing his 
comments to Marvin's counsel, "[i] n 2005, your client claimed 
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$165,000 in commissions . . . . Now, you're saying commissions are 
zero, and rent has somehow increased. I don't understand how rent 
has increased. I don; t understand how or why commission was 
declared as income in 2005, and it's not now. It's now being 
called rent." (Tr. p. 132, L. 6 - L. 12). 
The magistrate issued its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law 
and Order and concluded that Marvin was to pay to Susan child 
support each month in the amount of $1,311.50. (R. p. 44). The 
magistrate reached this conclusion by finding that "[t]he court is 
persuaded that monies generated by MST and MSA, from which 
commissions were previously paid to Marvin, are required to be paid 
to [Montoya Enterprises] as rent, which, in turn, service the 
mortgage and maintenance costs of operating an office building that 
did not exist in prior years." (R. p. 43). The magistrate 
additionally refused to award Susan attorney fees indicating that 
Susan "failed to demonstrate that she lacks sufficient income and 
resources with which to pay her attorney's fees." (R. p. 42). 
On appeal to the district court, Susan argued successfully 
that the magistrate erred in determining the parties' respective 
incomes for child support purposes by ignoring and/or misconstruing 
evidence presented at trial. Susan requested attorney fees and 
costs on appeal pursuant to I.C. § 12-121 and I.A.R. 41. The 
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district court vacated the magistrate's findings on child support 
and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its 
opinion. (R. p. 71). The district court reviewed the magistrate's 
findings and explained that the difference in the income levels 
asserted by Susan and those asserted by Marvin "appears to be the 
fact that the husband completed construction of a new office 
building. which was encumbered by a mortgage indebtedness of 
$2,200,000." (R. p. 68). The district court further explained: 
Apparently, the entity that now owns the 
office building had, in prior years, 
distributed income to the community in the 
form of commissions. At the time of trial, 
this entity was required to use the money for 
debt service on the $2.2 million dollar 
mortgage, and was not, therefore, able to 
distribute commissions to the husband. 
(R. p. 68-69). 
The district court recognized that Marvin paid significantly 
less per month in rent for his businesses prior to trial compared 
to the amount he was paying each month to service the mortgage on 
his new building. (R. p. 69). Additionally, the district court 
recognized that Marvin was paying the entirety of the expense of 
the new building even though he was actually only using a portion 
of it for his businesses. (R. p. 69). 
The district court stated, "[w]hat is missing from the trial 
court's analysis below is an evaluation of whether the new level of 
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occupancy expense - - $20,000 per month instead of the much lower 
figure - was a 'necessary and reasonable' business expense to 
impose on the business." (R. p. 70) . The district court concluded 
that money being paid in excess of that reasonable to Marvin's 
businesses, or which reduces the debt and enhances Marvin's estate 
(or net worth) should be considered as Marvin's income for child 
support purposes. (R. p. 71). 
With respect to Susan's request for costs and attorney fees, 
the district court awarded Susan costs and stated, "[n]o attorney 
fees at this stage; the magistrate may consider the issue of 
attorney fees for the entirety of the proceedings after remand." 
(R. p. 71). 
Prior to the magistrate addressing the issues on remand, 
Marvin filed the instant appeal. 
Susan filed a Motion for Costs and Attorney Fees at Trial, On 
Appeal to the District Court, and on Appeal to the Idaho Supreme 
Court. (Supp. R. pp. 13-19) . The magistrate denied Susan's motion. 
(Supp. R. pp. 39-40). Susan appealed directly from the 
magistrate's decision. 
------------ i-- - -·-- - -
II. 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
Marvin asserts that there are five issues on appeal: 
1. What is the role of the Memorandum Decision of the 
district court in this appeal? 
2. Was the magistrate's award of child support a manifest 
abuse of discretion? 
3. Did the magistrate consider all of the evidence before 
him? 
4. Was Susan entitled to attorney fees? 
5. Marvin claims attorney fees in this appeal pursuant to 
Idaho Code Section 12-121 and Idaho Appellate Rule 41. 
Is he entitled to them? 
Susan would restate the issues as follows: 
1. Whether the district court's memorandum decision should 
be reviewed directly. 
2. Whether the district court erred in vacating the 
findings of the magistrate on child support and 
remanding for consideration of the district court's 
decision. 
3. Whether the district court erred in deferring the issue 
of attorney fees until after remand. 
4. Whether Marvin is entitled to costs and attorney fees 
on appeal. 
5. Whether Susan is entitled to costs and attorney fees on 
appeal. 
III. 
ISSUE PRESENTED ON CROSS-APPEAL 
1. Whether the magistrate abused its discretion in 
denying Susan's motion for attorney fees when the 
attorney fees were incurred in an attempt to secure 




GENERAL STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
Findings of fact made by the trial court will not be set 
aside unless they are clearly erroneous. Rohr v. Rohr, 118 Idaho 
689, 691, 800 P.2d 85, 87 (1990). Thus, any findings of fact 
will not be disturbed on appeal if supported by substantial and 
competent evidence, even though such evidence may be conflicting. 
Id.; Quiring v. Quiring, 130 Idaho 560, 563, 944 P.2d 695, 698 
(1997). Evidence is regarded as substantial if a reasonable 
trier of fact would accept it and rely upon it in determining 
whether a disputed point of fact had been proven. In re 
Williamson, 135 Idaho 452, 454, 19 P.3d 766, 788 (2001). 
Questions of law are reviewed on appeal freely. B1iss v. B1iss, 
127 Idaho.170, 172, 898 P.2d 1081, 1083 (1995). A trial court's 
findings under the Idaho Child Support Guidelines are reviewed 
for substantial and competent evidence. See Ire1and v. Ire1and, 
123 Idaho 955, 855 P.2d 40 (1993). 
B. 
This Appellate Court Shall Directly Review the District Court's 
Decision. 
When the district court serves as an intermediate appella~e 
court, this Court must review the decision of the district court 
directly. Losser v. Bradstreet, 145 Idaho 670, 183 P.3d 758 
(2008); Bonner County v. Kootenai Hosp. Dist. (In re Danie1 W.), 
145 Idaho 677, 183 P.3d 765 (2008). In Losser, the Idaho Supreme 
Court clarified the standard of review when reviewing a decision 
of the district court acting in its appellate capacity. The 
Supreme Court determined that although for decades it had been 
directly reviewing the magistrate court's decision independently 
of, but with due regard for, the district court's decision, the 
structure of the Idaho appellate rules require the Court to 
directly review the district court's decision and consider 
whether the district court committed error. Id. With respect to 
the magistrate's decision, this Court must review the 
magistrate's findings to determine whether they are supported by 
substantial and competent evidence and whether the decision was 
correct as a matter of law. Losser, 145 Idaho at 672, 183 P.3d 
at 760 (quoting Nicholls v. Blaser, 102 Idaho 559, 561, 633 P.2d 
1137, 1139 (1981)) . 
In Appellant's Brief, Marvin argues that the Memorandum 
Decision of the district court is advisory only. (Appellant's 
Brief, p. 22). However, as the Idaho Supreme Court recently 
explained in Losser, this Court must directly review the decision 
of the district court for error and must review the magistrate's 
findings to determine whether they are supported by substantial 
and competent evidence. 
C. 
The District Court Did Not Err When it Vacated the Magistrate's 
Decision on Child Support and Remanded for Consideration of 
Whether an Occupancy Expense Falls Within the Definition of 
Reasonable and Ordinary Business Expense. 
A child support award will not be disturbed on appeal absent 
an abuse of discretion. Noble v. Fisher, 126 Idaho 885, 888, 894 
P.2d 118, 121 (1995). A magistrate will be found to have abused 
its discretion if it fails to give consideration to relevant 
factual circumstances or if its findings are not supported by the 
evidence. Rohr v. Rohr, 126 Idaho 1, 3, 878 P.2d 175, 177 (Ct. 
App. 1994). The magistrate's findings are supported by the 
evidence if the evidence on which it relies is substantial and 
competent. Id. 
The district court acknowledged the magistrate's findings 
and conclusions but found that the magistrate's decision should 
be vacated because the magistrate failed to give consideration to 
relevant factual circumstances. The district court recognized 
that the difference in income between the amount Marvin alleged 
and the amount Susan set forth by historical evidence revolved 
around the fact that Marvin completed construction of an office 
building which was encumbered by a mortgage of $2,200,000.00 and 
that Marvin used income from one of his business entities for 
debt service on the $2.2 million dollar mortgage rather than 
distributing it as income. 
The district court correctly referenced the child support 
guidelines, I.R.C.P. 6(c). Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure, 
6(0) (6), also referred to as the Idaho Child Support Guidelines, 
applies to the determination of each parties' child support 
obligation. The Idaho Child Support Guidelines define gross 
income as follows: 
Gross income includes income from any source, 
and includes, but is not limited to, income 
from salaries, wages, commissions, bonuses, 
dividends, pensions, interest, trust income, 
annuities, social security benefits, workers' 
compensation benefits, unemployment insurance 
benefits, disability insurance benefits, 
alimony, maintenance, any veteran's benefits 
received, education grants, scholarships, 
other financial aid and disability and 
retirement payments to or on behalf of a 
child calculated per section 11. The court 
may consider when and for what duration the 
receipt of funds from gifts, prizes, net 
proceeds from property sales, severance pay, 
and judgments will be considered as available 
for child support. Benefits received from 
public assistance programs for the parent 
shall be included except in cases of 
extraordinary hardship. Child support 
received is assumed to be spent on the child 
and is not income of the parent. 
I.R.C.P. 6(c) (6), Section 6(a) (1) (i) (emphasis added). 
In analyzing Marvin's income, the magistrate found that 
although Marvin's income averaged $338,629 in years 2005, 2004, 
and 2003, his income had decreased in 2006 to $140,339. (R. pp. 
42-44). The magistrate explained this decrease in income by 
stating that monies generated by two of Marvin's companies, MST 
and MS, which had previously been used to pay Marvin, were now 
required to be paid to Montoya Enterprises as rent and that the 
rent was being used to service a mortgage on an office building. 
(R. p. 43). 
It was undisputed at trial that the commission income paid 
to MST was still being earned and collected. It was also 
undisputed that the commission income which had previously been 
paid to Marvin directly was now being used to pay "rent" to 
Montoya Enterprises for an office building owned by Marvin 
himself. 
The magistrate focused on the fact that the construction of 
the office building was completed approximately six months prior 
to the divorce action being filed. (R. p. 43). However, 
Marvin's accountant testified that January 2006 was the first 
time rent was paid in that fashion. (Tr. p. 168, L. 21 - L. 23). 
That change occurred one month prior to Susan filing for divorce 
in February, 2006. Despite evidence that the rent did not 
increase to $20,000 until January 2006, Marvin's accountant 
testified that the monthly payment on the building debt 
(including interest and principal) was an expense that began in 
June of 20Q5 when the construction loan turned to a term loan. 
(Tr. p. 135, L. 2 - L. 11). (Tr. p. 133, L. 5 - L. 11). This 
is why "income and expenses from self-employment or operation of 
a business must be closely reviewed to determine the level of 
gross income of a parent to satisfy a child support obligation. 
I.C.S.G. Section 6(a) (2). 
Marvin continued to receive commission income from MST 
through the entire year of 2005 consistent with commission income 
from previous years.' See Plaintiff's Exhibit 19. The 
magistrate asked if the expense of $17,689 in rent began after 
June of 2005, "what was the source of Mr. Montoya's commission 
income in 2005 that shows up on his tax return?" (Tr. p. 135, L. 
12 - L. 14). The question was never answered. The magistrate 
did not perform a careful review. 
In 2005, Marvin received commissions in the amount of 
$165,296. See Plaintiff's Exhibit 19. 
Rather than MST issuing a check directly to Marvin, as it 
had done previously, MST paid the commissions to MS which paid 
Marvin's other company, Montoya Enterprises under the guise of 
rent. The commissions remained income for child support purposes 
whether they were being paid directly to Marvin or merely 
transferred into his solely owned asset. Because the magistrate 
ignored this evidence and did not carefully review the expense, 
the district court correctly remanded the case for the magistrate 
to follow Section (a) (2) of the Idaho Child Supp9rt Guidelines. 
The purpose of the Idaho Child Support Guidelines is to 
ensure parents properly support their children in accordance with 
their income. The magistrate's analysis was missing an 
evaluation of whether servicing the $2.2 million dollar mortgage 
was a "necessary and reasonable" business expense given the past 
method and amount of payment. The district court further stated 
that money being paid in excess of that reasonable to the 
business, or which reduces the debt and enhances Marvin's 
property should not be "applied to reduce [Marvin's] income for 
purposes of child support determination." (R. p. 71). The 
magistrate did not conduct an analysis at all of Marvin's alleged 
expenses for the operation of his business. 
The Idaho Child Support Guidelines define rents and business 
income, in pertinent part, as follows: 
For rents, royalties, or income derived from 
a trade or business (whether carried on as a 
sole proprietorship, partnership, or closely 
held corporation), gross income is defined as 
gross receipts minus ordinary and necessary 
expenses required to carry on the trade or 
business or to earn rents and royalties. 
Excluded from ordinary and necessary expenses 
under these Guidelines are expenses 
determined by the court to be inappropriate 
for determining gross income for purposes of 
calculating child support. In general, income 
and expenses from self-employment or 
operation of a business should be carefully 
reviewed to determine the level of gross 
income of the parent to satisfy a child 
support obligation. This amount may differ 
from a determination of business income for 
tax purposes. 
I.R.C.P. 6(c) (6), Section 6(a) (2) (emphasis added). Income for 
the self-employed parent may differ from a determination of 
business income for tax purposes. Nobie, 126 Idaho at 855, 894 
P.2d at 118. 
Prior to MST and MS occupying the office building owned by 
Marvin, the entities paid rent each month of, according to Mr. 
Veloz, approximately $6,000. (Tr. p. 127, L. 8 - L. 11). One 
month after the divorce is filed, voi1a!, the entities begin 
paying rent of $20,000 per month. The rent paid by the entities 
would normally be an ordinary and necessary expense required to 
carry on the business as referred to in Section 6(a) (2) of Rule 6 
of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. However, Marvin then 
chose to pay rent three times that of his prior rent expense. 
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Additionally, rent is also considered income pursuant to the 
Idaho Child Support Guidelines. See I.R.C.P. 6(c) (6), Section 
6(a) (2). Thus, any rent paid to Montoya Enterprises is income to 
Marvin regardless of the fact that MST paid money to Montoya 
Enterprises rather than to Marvin himself in the form of 
commissions. Additionally, as the mortgage of the office 
building is paid each month, Marvin's net worth increases with 
each principal reduction, providing that the property holds its 
value. 
In Chancller v. Chancller, 136 Idaho 246, 32 P.3d 140 (2001) 
the Idaho Supreme Court reviewed a magistrate's calculation of 
income for child support purposes. The father in that case was 
self-employed and the lower court relied on financial records of 
the company the father owned to determine the father's income. 
The financial records indicated that the father received $5,417 
per month in income. The lower court determined that for child 
support purposes, the father's income was approximately $65,000 
per year plus some "perks" consisting of tip and rental income. 
The lower court found that these "perks" provided the father with 
"additional means to discharge personal debt and pay support." 
Id. at 252, 32 P.3d at 146. However, the lower court did not 
include any of the income from the "perks" in reaching its 
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conclusion about the father's income. On appeal, the Supreme 
Court held that the "perks" had to be included as additional 
income to the father and that the father's income needed to be 
recalculated to include those amounts. 
The instant case is similar. Although Marvin re-labeled his 
commissions as an expense, the fact is that the commissions, or a 
portion thereof, are being used to pay rent to Marvin. Marvin's 
choice to pay rent to discharge his own personal debt and 
increase his equity does not exclude it as income for child 
support purposes. 
Rent is considered income pursuant to the Idaho Child 
Support Guidelines and the magistrate ignored the rent earned by 
Marvin when determining Marvin's income. Evidence at trial 
revealed that Marvin received commission income sufficient to 
exceed his monthly mortgage payment and that for a period of 
seven months, from January to July 2006, there was a net income 
of $19,958.45. (Tr. p. 168, L. 3 - L. 19). Said sum, which was 
only from a period of seven months, is in addition to the 
increase of equity in the building and the discharge of Marvin's 
personal debt as the loan principal was decreased. Testimony was 
presented that the office building, although not yet fully 
occupied, was occupied by other tenants in addition to MS and MST 
and that Marvin was receiving rent from these tenants. (Tr. p. 
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97, L. 19 - L. 20). Marvin built an office building with space 
greater than his needs but then placed the entire cost of that 
building against his income. 
The district court recognized that the magistrate failed to 
carefully review Marvin's income and expenses from business which 
caused child support to be set artificially low. The district 
court did not err in remanding the case for consideration of 
these business expenses. 
Marvin argues that the district court's conclusions are 
flawed. (Appellant's Brief, p. 27). First, Marvin attempts to 
distinguish the income and expenses earned and paid by his 
companies from his own personal income and expenses. However, 
the two are not distinguishable because Marvin is the sole owner 
of his companies and thus income to the companies equates to 
income to Marvin. Marvin made the decision to have his company 
service the $2.2 million dollar debt, even though the company was 
paying for "extra" space intended for lease to third parties. 
Marvin attempts to support his argument by stating that if 
Marvin's company had not been charged with servicing the debt, he 
would have to personally pay the debt and thus the expense would 
still be a factor in the determination of Marvin's income for 
child support purposes. (Appellant's Brief, p. 28). This is 
inaccurate. The Idaho Child Support Guidelines do not allow for 
an individual's income to be adjusted or reduced because he or 
she incurs debt even if as an investment. 2 Marvin's income would 
remain the same. Susan has not and does not argue that Marvin's 
income should only be based upon the activities of two of 
Marvin' s businesse.s. Marvin should not, however, be able to 
reduce his income for child support purposes by making an 
investment in a building, which will, as payments of the mortgage 
are made, increase his net worth. 
Since the magistrate failed to give consideration to all 
relevant factual circumstances, the district court did not err in 
vacating the magistrate's decision and remanding for further 
consideration. 
D. 
The District Court Did Not Err in Deferring the Issue of Attorney 
Fees to the Magistrate. 
Marvin argues that the district court "articulated no basis 
for an award of attorney fees to Susan." (Appellant's Brief, p. 
31). The district court neither awarded nor denied a request for 
attorney fees. It simply deferred the decision to the magistrate 
after remand. This cannot be considered error. 
2 For example, per Rule 6 (c) (6), Section 4 (b) of the Idaho 
Child Support Guidelines, "child support shall be given priority 
over the needs of. . creditors in allocating family 
resources." Similarly, net proceeds from the sale of an asset 
can be considered a resource for child support purposes, Section 
6(a) (1), and under-producing assets may be assessed reasonable 
monetary value so .that there is an adequate award of child 
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E. 
Marvin is Not Entitled to Costs and Attorney Fees on Appeal. 
Marvin seeks attorney fees on appeal pursuant to I.C. § 12-
121 and I.A.R. 41. Section 12-121 permits an award of attorney 
fees in a civil action to the prevailing party if the court 
determines that the case was brought, pursued or defended 
frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation. Ba1derson v. 
Ba1derson, 1.27 Idaho 48, 54, 896 P.2d 956, 962 (1995). 
The instant case is based upon the unreasonable efforts 
Marvin made to reduce his child support obligation. Susan was 
the prevailing party on appeal to the district court and thus her 
actions cannot be categorized as frivolous or unreasonable. 
Susan is merely attempting to secure proper child support that 
should have been awarded for her children. 
F. 
Susan is Entitled to Costs and Attorney Fees on Appeal and Below. 
Susan seeks an award of costs and attorney fees pursuant to 
I.e.§§ 12-121 and 32-704, as well as I.A.R. 41. As previously 
stated, section 12-121 permits an award of attorney fees in a 
civil action to the prevailing party if the court determines that 
the case was brought, pursued or defended frivolously, 
unreasonably or without foundation. Ba1derson, 127 Idaho at 54, 
896 P.2d at 962. 
Marvin has, starting with the motion for a temporary child 
RESPONDENT/CROSS-APPELLANT'S BRIEF - Pm~~ ?4 
support award and throughout the proceedings, taken an 
unreasonable position and attempted to manipulate his cash flow 
to decrease his gross income for child support purposes. 
Marvin threw several unfounded accusations at Susan throughout 
the trial. For example, he alleged that she suffered from 
postpartum depression and other mental illnesses, when tests 
showed otherwise. Marvin compared Susan, in a sworn affidavit, 
to Andrea Yates, the mother who killed her children. Marvin 
accused Susan, in open court, of using methamphetamine. Marvin 
filed frivolous motions causing Susan to incur substantial 
attorney fees to defend herself. Susan should be awarded costs 
and attorney fees pursuant to I.C. § 12-121. 
Additionally, a court may, after considering the financial 
resources of both parties and the factors set forth. in 
I.C. § 32-705, "order a party to pay a reasonable amount for the 
cost to the other party of maintaining or defending any 
proceeding under this act and for attorney's fees, including sums 
for legal services rendered and costs incurred prior to the 
commencement of the proceedings or after the entry of judgment." 
I.C. § 32-704(3). 
The Idaho Court of Appeals held in Stephens v. Stephens, 138 
Idaho 195, 61 P.3d 63 (Ct. App. 2002), .that a disparity in income 
between the parties is generally sufficient to justify an award 
of attorney fees under I.e.§ 32-704(3). 
The magistrate found that at the time of trial, Susan was 
employed at Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley, LLP, as a full time 
office manager earning $93,000 a year. Susan's income is not 
disputed on appeal. 
The magistrate characterized Marvin's income as "hotly 
contested" and concluded that Marvin's income from self-
employment was $140,339 a year. At trial, Susan presented 
evidence, based upon the parties' tax returns, of Marvin's 
historical income, which averaged $338,629 for years 2005, 2004, 
and 2003. Marvin does not argue that his income is less than 
$140,339 per year. Thus, clearly Marvin earns a significantly 
greater income than Susan and has greater resources to pay 
attorney fees. 
Susan has been forced to expend considerable costs and legal 
fees at the trial level as well as on appeal merely to secure a 
proper child support award for the parties' children. Child 
support payments are intended for the benefit of the children. 
AJ.ber v. AJ.ber, 93 Idaho 755, 758, 472 P.2d 321, 324 (1970). 
Moreover, courts have recognized as public policy that to protect 
the best interests of the children, a parent should have the 
ability to have his or her day in court to secure a proper child 
support award. See Burke v. Burke, 96 Wn. App. 474, 980 P.2d 265 
(Wash. App. Ct. 1999). A parent should not be frozen out of 
litigation affecting proper support for the welfare of the 
children, due to the inability to pay attorney fees as they 
accrue. Id. 
Susan does not have sufficient resources with which to pay 
her attorneys fees and costs in this matter and Marvin has 
significantly greater resources than Susan. Therefore, based 
upon the disparity in income and assets between the parties, this 
Court should award Susan reasonable costs and attorney fees at 
trial and on appeal. 
G. 
The Magistrate Abused its Discretion in Denying Susan's Motion 
for Attorney Fees. 
After the district court's appellate decision was issued, 
the case remanded, and Marvin appealed to this court, Susan 
sought attorney fees pursuant to I.C. § 32-704. Susan argued 
that due to the disparity in income between Susan and Marvin and 
the fact that Susan did not have the resources available to pay 
her attorney fees, Susan should be awarded attorney fees. Marvin 
objected to the award of fees on several grounds. 3 {Supp. R. pp. 
20-27). In addition, both parties filed supporting affidavits. 
{Supp. R. pp. 28-37). 
3 Initially, Marvin argued that the motion for attorney fees 
was pre-mature. The magistrate correctly concluded at the 
hearing that under section 32-704, the motion was not prematurely 
brought. 
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Section 32-704 allows a court to award attorney fees after 
considering the financial resources of both parties and the 
factors set forth in I.C. § 32-705. Section 32-705 lists five 
factors the court may consider including the financial resources 
of the spouse seeking maintenance and the marital property 
apportioned to said spouse. 
At hearing, Susan again reiterated the disparity between the 
parties' incomes. Even using Marvin's artificially low income of 
$140,000, there is a disparity of almost $50,000. Moreover, it 
was established at trial that there was a great disparity in net 
worth or the assets of the parties. Susan testified that she had 
retirement in the amount of approximately $94,000 and 
approximately $66,000 in equity in her home. (Tr. p. 38, L. 3 -
p. 39, L. 2). On the other hand Marvin's net worth was 
established at over $3.8 million dollars. 
21). See Exhibit 52A. 
(Tr. p. 39, L. 17 - L. 
The magistrate found that the difference between $140,000 
income versus $93,000 was not significant enough such that 
attorney fees should be awarded. (Tr. Cross~Appeal p. 24, L. 22 
- p. 25, L. 25). The magistrate failed to consider, however, the 
disparity in the parties' net worth as is one of the factors 
listed under Section 32-705. The magistrate stated that even if 
it determined Marvin's income was greater than $140,000, the 
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difference in child support would not be sufficient to cover the 
fees Susan had expended. In relying on this hypothetical, the 
magistrate appeared to blame Susan for not being in a position to 
afford the legal fees. However, whether Susan has been forced to 
expend attorney fees in an amount greater than the child support 
figure used in the magistrate's hypothetical is irrelevant. The 




The district court did not err when it vacated the 
magistrate's decision and remanded for consideration of whether 
an occupancy expense falls within the definition of reasonable 
and ordinary business expense. Additionally, it is not err in 
deferring the issue of attorney fees to the magistrate. Finally, 
the magistrate abused its discretion when it denied Susan's 
request for attorney fees. Susan should be awarded attorney fees 
on appeal and below pursuant to I.C. §§ 32-704 and 12-121. 
DATED this 1it1>- day of January, 2009. 
BEVIS, THIRY & SCHINDELE, P.A. 
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